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A. Introduction 
Offences against the administration or obstruction of justice have always been referred to as 
sensitive and complicated in nature.1  It is submitted that these offences touch upon the core, 
heart or engine of the of the criminal justice procedure. Notwithstanding the prevalence of these 
offences in  organized crime trials at domestic level, their occurrences is visiting upon door 
steps of international criminal justice on very unprecedented levels.2 It is only logical that 
international criminal courts and tribunals have had no choice but to borrow a leaf from the 
domestic courts on how to curb the occurrence.3  Among Courts and tribunals that are fast 
being overrun by such offences is the International Criminal Court (ICC). The ICC has been 
among the very few international institutions whose legal and procedural framework has 
aroused high expectations4 and at times deeper but controversial suspicions.5 This is likely to 
continue as the ICC forges ahead with the development of its jurisprudence. Indicted persons 
will always try to out-pace the Court as regards its integrity. It is only pertinent that the ICC 
stays one step ahead of criminals in its endeavor to bring impunity to an end and contribute to 
justice processes.  From a policy-oriented jurisprudential perspectives this article discusses 
offences against the administration of justice provided for within mainly the Rome Statute’s 
Article 70. Through relevant case-law of the ICC and lessons from the internationalized 
criminal tribunals, this work considers the ICC decision-making processes , expectation and 
challenges  regards implementation of Article 70 and related provisions. It further touches on 
the related problem of subpoena testimonies. Finally the article considers policy alternatives 
that can minimize implementation challenges as regards offences against the administration of 
justice. 
 
B.  Offences against the Administration of Justice 
It is suggested that in order for international criminal justice to continue taking great strides on 
the international arena, it is supposed to ensure that administration of justice is implemented in 
accordance with the aspirations and expectations of the world community. It therefore has to 
                                                          
1 G. Roberts, ‘Article 70’, Case Matrix Network (CMN), http://www.casematrixnetwork.org/cmn-knowledge-
hub/icc-commentary-clicc/commentary-rome-statute/commentary-rome-statute-part-6/, 15 May, 2015. 
2 R. Cryer, ‘Witness Tampering and International Criminal Tribunals’, 27(1) Leiden Journal of International Law 
(2014), 192-193. 
3 Ibid. 
4 See generally, D. Bosco, Rough Justice: The International Criminal Court in a World of Power Politics, New 
York, Oxford University Press, 2014. 
5 A.K.A Greenwalt, ‘Justice Without Politics? Prosecutorial Discretion and the International Criminal Court’, 39 
New York University Journal of International Law and Politics, (2006-2007), 583-585. 
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be in tandem with a ‘world public order of human dignity.’6  This is where there is a postulation 
of fairness-oriented values, rationally-managed processes,7 justice encompassing values and 
provision of greatest enjoyment of human values.8 Courts have always had an inherent 
jurisdiction to ensure that the administration of justice is not an obstructed, prejudiced or absurd 
one.9 This has been the case from as early as year 1600 when offences against administration 
of justice were considered on allegations of witness tampering or interference. A trial judge 
had made depositions admissible because the defendant had attempted to bribe or ‘spirit away’ 
two witnesses.10 In another witness tampering case, it was held that if a witness testified and 
was later detained by the means or procurement of the prisoner, then such evidence could be 
used against the defendant.11 From the foregoing, it is suggested that administration of justice 
as a core value of any progressive criminal justice system, should seek to approximate optimum 
order12 and human dignity.13 These are values and processes that any enlightened community 
cherishes.14 Human dignity has been explained as aiming to provide a comprehensive 
framework of harnessing and revitalizing human capabilities in a rationally-organized free 
society as a means of achieving an enjoyment of human values.15 In considering particular 
decisions as regards the administration of justice, it is submitted that the same should be 
appraised by looking at the degree of contribution to the attainment of integrity and a public 
order of human dignity.16 This can as well be extended to both the road to Rome and the actual 
                                                          
6 FS Tipson, ‘The Lasswell-McDougal Enterprise: Toward a World Public Order of Human Dignity’ 14 Virginia 
Journal of International Law (1973-1974) 536. 
7 M.McDougal, ‘Perspectives for an International Law of Human Dignity’ in McDougal & Associates 42 Studies 
in World Public Order New Haven, New Haven Press (1987) 987. 
8 M. McDougal, H. Lasswell & Chen ‘Human Rights and World Public Order: A Framework for Policy-Oriented 
Inquiry’ 63 American Journal of International Law (1969) 237. 
9 M. Bohlander, ‘International Criminal Tribunals and Their Power to Punish Contempt and False Testimony’, 12 
Criminal Law Forum (2001), 91–118; see also Prosecutor v. Tadic, IT-94-1, Judgment on Allegations of 
Contempt Against Prior Counsel, Milan Vuji, 31 January, 2000, paras 13-18, 
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/tadic/acjug/en/vuj-aj000131e.pdf, accessed on 19 September 2015 ; see also 
Prosecutor v. Aleksovski, IT-95-14/1-AR77, Judgment on Appeal by Nobilo Against Finding of Contempt, May, 
30, 2001, http://www.icty.org/x/cases/aleksovski/acjug/en/nob-aj010530e.pdf , accessed on 19 September 2015; 
Prosecutor v. Kamuhanda, ICTR-99-54A- A, Oral Decision (Rule 115 and Contempt of False Testimony), 19 th 
May, 2005, http://41.220.139.198/Portals/0/Case%5CEnglish%5CKamuhanda%5Cdecisions%5C190505.pdf, 
accessed on 19 September 2015.. 
10 Harrison’s Case, 12 How. St. Tr. 833, 851 (HL 1692). 
11 Lord Morley’s Case, 6 How. St. Tr, 769, 771 (H.L 1666). 
12 S. Wiessner, ‘Law as a Means to a Public Order of Human Dignity: The Jurisprudence of Mich ael Reisman’, 
34 Yale Journal of International Law (2009), p.525. 
13 S. Wiesserner, Michael Reisman, ‘Human Dignity and Law’, in Arsanjani, M.H, Cogan, J, Sloane, R, Wiessrner, 
S. (Eds.) Looking to the Future: Essays on International Law in Honour of W. Michael Reisman, Martinus Nijhoff, 
Leiden, 2010,  pp. 21-30. 
14 See generally, H.D, Lasswell & M.S McDougal Jurisprudence for a Free Society: Studies in Law, Science, and 
Policy (Volume 1 Leiden, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1992). 
15 F.S, Timpson (n6) 536. 
16 W.M, Reisman, ‘Theory About Law: Jurisprudence for a Free Society’, 108 Yale Law Journal, (1999),  p. 937 
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negations. The travaux preparatoires point to the fact that criminalising against offences or acts 
relating to administration of justice, was an express intention to protect the integrity of the 
future Court.17 Further to this and pursuant to their national legal systems experiences,  the 
negotiators at Rome found it pertinent to rework the proposals of the Preparatory Committee 
and come up with two main categories namely: (i) offences against the administration of 
justice, and (ii) Misconduct before the Court.18  It has to be observed that despite the ICC 
existence for over a decade now, coupled with various scholarly work, jurisprudential 
development, continuous policy evaluation and assessment of legal structures and procedures, 
little or minimal conscious and systematic efforts have visited upon the clearly and consistent 
problems of the implementation of offences against the administration of justice.  ICC actors 
on their varied stand-points as decision-makers19 have had no proper jurisprudence to fall on 
during this unchartered course of justice.20 Unless properly developed, there is a likely risk of 
ending up with an inconsistent, unfair and unyielding process.  
 
In the Statute of the ICC, adopted in Rome on 17th July, 1998, articles 70 and 71 provide as 
follows: 
Article 70 : Offences against the administration of justice 
1. The Court shall have jurisdiction over the following offences against its administration 
of justice when committed intentionally: 
(a) Giving false testimony when under an obligation pursuant to article 69, paragraph 
1, to tell the truth; 
(b) Presenting evidence that the party knows is false or forged; 
                                                          
17 ‘Proposal Submitted by the United States on Offences against the Integrity of the Court’ UN Doc. 
A/AC.249/WP41 (13 September 1996); ‘Working Paper Submitted by Australia and the Netherlands’ UN Doc. 
A/AC.249/L.2, pp. 26-27; see generally T. Gut, Counsel Misconduct Before the International Criminal Court: 
Professional Responsibility in International Criminal Defence (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2012). 
18 W. Schabas The International Criminal Court: A Commentary on the Rome Statute (Oxford, Oxford University 
Press, 2012), p. 854; ‘Report of the Working Group on Procedural Matters,’ UN Doc. 
A/CONF.183/C.1/WGPM/L.2/Add.7; Articles 70 and 71 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court; 
Rules 169 -172 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence (ICC RPE). 
19 Investigators, prosecutors, defence and judges. 
20 It is only recently that Offences against the Administration of Justice have started taking shape within the ICC. 
With increasing indictments for offences within the Rome Statute, such offences are likely to be on the increase. 
No trial has ever been held in this regard and so far there are only indictments as follows: The Prosecutor –v- Jean 
Pierre Bemba Gombo, Aime Kilolo Musamba, Jean-Jacques Mangenda, Kabongo, Fidele Babala Wandu and 
Narcisse Aido, ICC-01/05-01/13, Decision Pursuant to Articles 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute, 11 
November 2014; Prosecutor –v- Walter Osapiri Barasa ICC-01/09-01/13-1-Red2, Warrant of Arrest for Walter 
Osapiri Barasa, 2 August 2013; Prosecutor –v- Paul Gicheru & Philip Kipkoech Bett, ICC-01/09-01/15 Public 
Redacted Version Decision on the Prosecution’s Application under Article 58(1) of the Rome Statute, 10 
September 2015. 
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(c) Corruptly influencing a witness, obstructing or interfering with the attendance or 
testimony of a witness, retaliating against a witness for giving testimony or 
destroying, tampering with or interfering with the collection of evidence; 
(d) Impeding, intimidating or corruptly influencing an official of the Court for the 
purpose of forcing or persuading the official not to perform, or to perform 
improperly, his or her duties; 
(e) Retaliating against an official of the Court on account of duties performed by that 
or another official; 
(f) Soliciting or accepting a bribe as an official of the Court in connection with his or 
her official duties. 
 
2. The principles and procedures governing the Court's exercise of jurisdiction over 
offences under this article shall be those provided for in the Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence. The conditions for providing international cooperation to the Court with 
respect to its proceedings under this article shall be governed by the domestic laws of 
the requested State. 
3. In the event of conviction, the Court may impose a term of imprisonment not exceeding 
five years, or a fine in accordance with the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, or both. 
4. (a)  Each State Party shall extend its criminal laws penalizing offences against the 
integrity of its own investigative or judicial process to offences against the 
administration of justice referred to in this article, committed on its territory, or by one 
of its nationals; 
(b) Upon request by the Court, whenever it deems it proper, the State Party shall submit 
the case to its competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution. Those authorities 
shall treat such cases with diligence and devote sufficient resources to enable them to 
be conducted effectively. 
 
From the foregoing, it can be observed that the ICC Statute vests judges with the primary 
authority to police or impose criminal penalties21 for any conduct that may harm the integrity 
of trial proceedings.22 Such policing of misconduct has even extended to orders for preventive 
                                                          
21 Boas, G, Bischoff, J.L, Reid, N,L, (2011) International Criminal Procedure:  International Criminal Law 
Practitioner Library, Cambridge, CUP, pp. 294-295 
22 Guariglia, F, & Rogier, E, (2015) The Selection of Situations and Cases by the OTP of the ICC, in Stahn, C, 
(Ed.) The Law and Practice of the International Criminal Court, Oxford, OUP, pp.388-389. 
 1 
 2 
 3 
 4 
 5 
 6 
 7 
 8 
 9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
5 
 
measures for the OTP to implement so as to curb misconduct recurring in future.23 Boas and 
others have described the ICC legal framework governing such authority as an ‘excellent 
illustration of complex rule-making product coupled with detailed and ostensibly exhaustive 
provisions.’24 It can as well be noted that Article 70(1) does not cover circumstances where a 
witness testifies without taking an oath or making a declaration.25 This is only used in 
exceptional circumstances because there is need for a witness to respect and own the evidence 
he or she avers in the Courtroom. He or she is bound to state the facts or the truth on the events 
seized by such a trial. It is submitted that the evidential burden of proof requires that the 
testimonial process preserves the integrity of such a trial by pointing to truthfulness and 
probative value of such a case. Further, for better prosecution of the offence herein, it is 
suggested that investigations should consider whether such a witness had been warned of 
consequences of giving false testimony. Subject to the nature of the prosecution processes for 
such offences, Schabas has argued that there may be situations where it would be inappropriate 
for the prosecution to handle the case. This is especially so where an official from the OTP is 
allegedly involved.26 There is no process provided within the Rome Statute or the ICC RPE for 
this situation. It is suggested that despite the  silence of the statute, possibly Schabas scenario 
emanates from the long held maxim for serving human good or natural justice, namely, nemo 
iudex in causa sua.27 Trends from predecessor tribunals such as the ICTY having been visited 
upon by the same circumstances have had to innovatively execute an amicus curiae as an ad 
hoc and independent investigator and prosecutor to see the process through.28 A similar 
approach has been adopted by the ICC. The practice emanating from the Chambers of the ICC 
points to the overall responsibility to investigate and prosecute such offences falling within the 
ambit and purview of the OTP.29 In the Lubanga Case, the Chamber was asking for the views 
of the parties and participants on the relationship between Article 70 and Rule 165 of the RPE; 
and whether the Prosecution alone may initiate and conduct investigations or whether scenarios 
                                                          
23 Prosecutor –v- Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta, Situation in the Republic of Kenya, Decision on Defence Application 
Pursuant to Article 64(4) and Related Requests,  ICC-01/09-02/11-729, TC V, ICC, 26 April, 2013, paras 89-90, 
97,https://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1585619.pdf, accessed on 02 April 2016. 
24 Boas, G, et. al, Op. Cit, p.295 
25 Rule 66(2) of the ICC RPE. 
26 Schabas (n 18) 857. 
27 No man should be judge in his own cause; see also A. Vermeule, ‘Contra Nemo Iudex in Sua Causa: The Limits 
of Impartiality’ (2012) 22 Yale Law Journal 384. 
28 Prosecutor –v- Brdanin (IT-99-36-R77), Order Instigating Proceedings Against Milka Maglov, 8 May, 2003, 
http://icty.org/x/file/Legal%20Library/jud_supplement/supp48-e/brdjanin.htm, accessed on 18 September 2015; 
Rule 77(C)(ii) of ICTY RPE. 
29 Prosecutor –v- Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Judgment Pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute, ICC-01/04-01/06, 
Decision of 14 March 2012, para 483, http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1379838.pdf,  accessed on 18 
September 2015. 
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described in Article 70(1) of the Statute should be within the investigative mandate of other 
investigators such as the Registry.30  The request had arisen from an inquiry by the VWU 
regarding an issue of whether upon their testimony, defence witnesses had been subjected to 
pressure or direct or indirect threats by a person recognised as a victim in the proceedings.31 In 
their submissions, the prosecution observed that from among the organs of the Court set out in 
Part V of the Statute, the general power to investigate is bestowed expressly and only upon the 
Prosecution.32 Neither the Statute nor the Rules confer any concurrent investigative or judicial 
functions elsewhere within the Court, and in particular upon the Registry.33 It has to be 
highlighted, that the defence has argued that when the prosecution has a conflict of interest, the 
Trial Chamber can ask the Registrar to appoint an amicus curiae to conduct the prosecution.34  
That notwithstanding, it is the exclusive discretion of the Prosecutor to investigate persons for 
potential violations. As opposed to the trend processes in the predecessor tribunals, the OTP 
interpretation and policy formulation has extended this interpretation to the effect that the 
Prosecutor cannot be ordered or seek instructions to conduct such investigations.35 Pursuant to 
Article 42(1) of the Statute, the Prosecutor runs an independent and separate organ of the Court 
responsible for conducting investigations and prosecutions. Further to this, initiation of an 
investigation,36 duties and powers of the Prosecutor with respect to investigations,37 and the 
rights of persons during an investigation38 confer investigative powers on the Prosecutor while 
deriving the base of power from the jurisdiction of the Court.39 It is the Prosecutor’s perspective 
that OTP has highly competent officers as the law requires,40 extensive practical experience in 
prosecution and trial,41legally mandated to appoint qualified staff as investigators,42resources 
                                                          
30 Ibid 
31 Ibid 
32 Prosecutor –v- Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Prosecution’s Observations on Article 70 of the Rome Statute, ICC-
01/04-01/06, 1st April, 2011, paras 1-2, https://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1050370.pdf , accessed on 1 April 
2016. 
33 Ibid, paras 1-2 
34 Observations de la Defense sur la mise en oeuvre de l’Article 70, Lubanga, Situation in the Democratic Republic 
of Congo, ICC-01/04-01/06-2715, Defence of Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, 1 April 2011, https://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1462060.pdf , accessed on 02 April 2016. 
35 Prosecutor –v- Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Prosecution Response to “Requête de la Défense de M. Lubanga aux 
fins de communication d’éléments de preuve recueillis par le Procureur dans le cadre des enquêtes conduites en 
vertu de l’Article 70” ICC-01/04-01/06  (Appeals Chamber), Submission of 25 March 2014, http://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1753007.pdf , para 6, accessed on 18 September 2015. 
36 Article 53 of the Rome Statute 
37 Article 54 of the Rome Statute 
38 Article 55 of the Rome Statute 
39 Lubanga Case, Prosecutor’s Observations, Op. Cit, paras 2-3. 
40 Article 42(2) of the Rome Statute 
41 Article 43(3) of the Rome Statute 
42 Article 44(1) of the Rome Statute 
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and expertise to investigate offences within Court’s jurisdiction.43 The initiation of 
investigations can be on the basis of information communicated by the Chamber or any reliable 
source.44 It is argued that suggested that for purposes of serving human good, equality of arms 
and fairness, such discretion cannot be left unchecked nor lack of review thereof. The Chamber 
should consider a policy-oriented legal interpretation that mirrors the values the ICC stands 
for. There is need for an interpretation that would make it possible for the defence as an equal 
actor in the decision-making process to request the Chamber to order the prosecution to conduct 
such investigations. When it was alleged that intermediaries recruited by the OTP to help with 
investigations were involved in alleged misconduct regarding witness testimony in Lubanga 
Dyilo Case,45 an independent consultant was retained to examine information in possession of 
the OTP. Factor processes for the independent consultant are confined to evidence already 
gathered by OTP and included: (i) evidence tendered as exhibits at trial including judgments, 
decisions; (ii) transcripts of witness testimony; (iii) decisions and judgments in the case; (iv) 
internal reports; (v) correspondence including emails, internal reports and memos. Upon 
finishing the examination, he had to advise the Prosecutor whether any investigations or 
prosecutions pursuant to Article 70 were warranted against the alleged offenders. Further, he 
had to recommend what further steps, if any, should be taken.46 Actors who can promote such 
process require considerable skill and experience as senior prosecutor and defence attorney.47 
On the basis of the report and conclusions, assessment of the evidence, OTP is required to make 
final decision as whether to pursue further investigations and or prosecutions. In another case 
of Prosecutor v. Jean Pierre Bemba Gombo. Aimé Kilolo Musamba, Narcisse Arido, Jean-
Jacques Mangenda Kabongo and Fidèle Babala Wandu,48 the prosecution sought the issuance 
of a warrant of arrest for the five for their alleged participation in several offences against the 
administration of justice. They were accused of allegedly and knowingly ordered, solicited or 
                                                          
43 “ ..its investigative Division, filled with trained investigator and attuned particularly to the needs of law 
enforcement, routinely deals with difficult investigations, including in the filed, and is sensitive to and e xperienced 
in handling and protecting confidential information, witness security and evidence ,” Lubanga Case, Prosecution’s 
Observations, para 5. 
44 Thomas Lubanga Dyilo Case (n 26) para 483. 
45 Thomas Lubanga Dyilo Case (n 27) para 8. 
46 Ibid 
47 Ibid 
48Prosecutor v. Jean Pierre Bemba Gombo. Aimé Kilolo Musamba, Narcisse Arido, Jean-Jacques Mangenda 
Kabongo and Fidèle Babala Wandu, Warrant of arrest for Jean-Pierre BEMBA GOMBO, Aimé KILOLO 
MUSAMBA, Jean-Jacques MANGENDA KABONGO, Fidèle BABALA WANDU and Narcisse ARIDO, ICC-
01/05-01/13-1-Red2-tENG 05-12-2013 1/16 RH PT, 20 November, 2013, https://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1694691.pdf , last accessed on 16 April, 2016. 
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induced witnesses to present false or forged evidence,49 and corruptly influenced witnesses.50 
It was held that the investigations were within the meaning of Article 70 of the Statute and 
Rule 165 of the RPE relating to the then ongoing case of Prosecutor –v- Jean-Pierre Bemba 
Gombo.51 It has to be noted that the ICC tasked an independent counsel to inter alia, review 
logs of telephone calls. The mandate and modus operandi for the independent counsel derived 
from status conferences.52 By engaging an independent counsel, it is suggested that the ICC 
intended to advance the similar pattern pursued in Lubanga Case , namely development of a 
Court monitored investigative practice and jurisprudence as regards administration of justice 
offences. It is further suggested that where an appointment for such an independent counsel is 
unlawful or procedurally flawed, then the evidence resulting from activities carried out by such 
a person can be deemed illegal or inadmissible, in violation of the Statute’s Article 69(7) and 
recognised international human rights.53 
 
Conduct covered by Article 71 also constitutes one of the offences defined in Article 70.54 Thus 
the Court shall proceed in accordance with Articles 70 and Rules 162 to 169 of the ICC RPE.  
Article 71: Sanctions for misconduct before the Court  
1. The Court may sanction persons present before it who commit misconduct, including 
disruption of its proceedings or deliberate refusal to comply with its directions, by 
administrative measures other than imprisonment, such as temporary or permanent 
removal from the courtroom, a fine or other similar measures provided for in the Rules 
of Procedure and Evidence.  
                                                          
49 Articles 70(1)(b) –(c) and 25(3)(b) of the Rome Statute 
50 Articles 70(1)(c) and 25(3)(b) of the Rome Statute 
51 Prosecutor –v- Jean Pierre Bemba Gombo, ICC-01/05-01/08-3343, 21 March, 2016, https://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc2226759.pdf, last accessed on 18 April 2016. 
52 Statute Conference on 30 August 2013, ICC-01/05-T-2-CONF-EXP-ENG; Statute Conference on 25 
September, 2013, ICC-01/05-T-3-CONF-EXP-ENG; Status Conference 10 October 2013, ICC-01/05-T-4-
CONF-EXP-ENG; Rapport intermediaire du conseil ad hoc of 1 October 2013, ICC-01/05-59-CONF-EXP, with 
confidential exparte Annex A. 
53 There is need for sufficiency and probative value of evidence, Pre-Trial Chamber II, “Decision Pursuant to 
Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute on the charges of the Prosecutor Against Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo”, 
15 June 2009, ICC-01/05-01/08-424, paras 41 and 42; Pre-Trial Chamber II, “Decision on Admissibility of 
Evidence and Other Procedural Matters”, 8 June 2014, ICC-01/04-02/06-308, para. 25; The Chamber is guidend 
to take great care in finding that a witness is or is not credible, Appeals Chamber, “Judgment on the appeal of the 
Prosecutor against the decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I of 16 December 2011 entitled ‘Decision on the 
confirmation of charges’”, 30 May 2012, ICC-01/04-01/10-514, para. 48.  
54 Rule 172 of the ICC RPE. 
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2. The procedures governing the imposition of the measures set forth in paragraph 1 shall 
be those provided for in the Rules of Procedure and Evidence. 
Apart from the above provisions within the Rome Statute, the Court’s Regulations provide for 
an extreme and broad worded discretionary authority to regulate non-compliance. This is a 
regulatory text that has no or little elaboration within the Rome Statute system. It states as 
follows:  
In the event of non-compliance by a participant with the provisions of any regulation, 
or with an order of a Chamber made thereunder, the Chamber may issue any order that 
is deemed necessary in the interests of justice.55 
It is trite from the provisions above that  there is a comprehensive outline of the offences and 
regulation of misconduct within the ICC legal framework. What makes these  provisions 
special is the fact that other international criminal tribunals such as the Special Court of Sierra 
Leone (SCSL), International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia (ICTY), International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) and the Extra-
ordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC) did not have offences against the 
administration of justice premised in their respective Statutes but rather Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence (RPE).56 Further, they never had specific and wide ranging discretionary powers 
regulating non-compliance of orders.57  It is suggested that possibly the negotiators at Rome 
intended to premise these offences within the statute and not the RPE as a way of demonstrating 
a serious paradigm shift from the challenges that had dogged the  predecessor tribunals in 
protecting the integrity of the court process.58 Further, it is suggested that clearly having the 
offences embossed within the statute as opposed to the RPE, was a signal to would be States 
Parties that the Rome Statute was an exceptional treaty that seriously wanted to be in control 
of the trial proceedings,  processes and integrity as opposed to control by  States Parties.59 
Depending on undesirable and inappropriate circumstances, the Court may not consult with 
                                                          
55 ICC Regulation 29(1); see also, ICC Regulation 29(2): This provision is without prejudice to the inherent 
powers of the Chambers, https://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/B920AD62-DF49-4010-8907-
E0D8CC61EBA4/277527/Regulations_of_the_Court_170604EN.pdf, accessed on 31 March 2016. 
56 Roberts, G., supra note 1, para 589, mostly referred to by the term contempt of court proceedings.  
57 It will have to be seen how the Chambers will apply these powers under Regulation 29 (1) of the ICC 
Regulations. 
58 Ad hoc Tribunals had its judges use ‘contempt of court’ in effecting decision-making regarding administration 
of justice offences and processes. This was mostly through ‘inherent powers or jurisdiction’ of such institutions. 
Such inherent power to prosecute though set out in the RPE of the ad hoc tribunals decision-makers conceptualised 
it as self-executing and existing independently of the said RPE; W. Schabas (n 18) pp. 854-855; Prosecutor –v- 
Brdanin (IT-99-36-R77), Decision on Motion for Acquittal Pursuant to Rule 98 bis, paras 15-16. 
59 ‘Report of the Working Group on Procedural Matters,’ UN Doc. A/CONF.183/C.1/WGPM/L.2/Add.7.  
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States Parties which may have (concurrent) jurisdiction over alleged offence.60 Factor 
processes for such circumstances may include but not limited to risk for unduly leak of 
information, chances of an arrest for a suspected criminal being thwarted,61 unlikely effective 
national prosecution, size and extent of organization of the alleged criminal effort, witness 
protection and general security situation with regard to persons associated with the 
proceedings.62 It is suggested that in considering these factor processes, the evidential burden 
lays with the prosecution in averring such information as necessary to prove that there is 
likelihood of unduly leak of information and thwart of arrest. Decision-makers can consider 
this on case to case basis and not blanket application. 
 
Turner63 has observed that policy formulation and legal interpretation as regards safeguarding 
against administration of justice offences has gradually changed. Initially, it was a strict focus 
on prejudice to the defendant,64 and ‘odious’65 to the integrity of proceedings.66 Thus the 
prejudice on the defendant is premised in the Chamber’s power to stay proceedings because of 
violations of an accused person’s fundamental human good or rights.67 Categories for such 
                                                          
60 Walter Osapiri Barasa Case (n 21), paras 1-3. 
61 Ibid. 
62 Paul Gicheru & Philip Kipkoech Bett Case, para 7. 
63 Turner, J.I, (2015) Accountability of International Prosecutors, in Stahn, C (Ed) The Law and Practice of the 
International Criminal Court, Oxford, OUP, p.389. 
64 Prosecutor –v- Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Decision on the Consequences of non-disclosure of exculpatory 
materials covered by Article 54(3)(e) agreements and the application to stay the prosecution of the accused, 
together with certain other issues raised at the status Conference on 10 June, 2008, ICC-01/04-01/06, 13 June, 
2008, para 17, 64 & 75, https://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc511249.PDF, last accessed on 03 April 2016; In 
order for the Chamber to ensure that due process was adhered to until the withheld evidence was reviewed, decided 
to indefinitely release the accused, Prosecutor –v- Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Decision on the release of Thomas 
Lubanga Dyilo, ICC-01/04-01/06-1418 02-07-2008 1/17 VW T, 2 July 2008, para 30, https://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc522804.PDF, last accessed on 03 April 2016; It has to be noted that the proceedings only 
resumed after the Appeals Chamber intervened and the information providers gave their consent to the Prosecution 
to proceed with the disclosure to the Chambers, Prosecutor –v- Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Reasons for Oral Decision 
Lifting the stay of proceedings, ICC-01/04-01/06-1644 23-01-2009 1/30 RH T, 23 January, 2009, para 13, 
https://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc622878.pdf , last accessed on 3 April, 2016. 
65 Prosecutor –v- Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Redacted Decision on the ‘Defence Application Seeking a Permanent 
Stay of the Proceedings’, Judgment of 7 March, 2011, ICC-01/04-01/06-2690-Red2 08-03-2011 1/92 FB T, para 
212, https://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1036342.pdf , last accessed on 03 April 2016. 
66 Prosecutor –v- Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Judgment on the Appeal of the Prosecution against the Decision of the 
Trial Chamber I entitled ‘ Decision on the consequences of non-disclosure of the exculpatory materials covered 
by Article 54(3)(e)  agreements and the application to stay the prosecution of the accused, together with certain 
other issues raised at the Status Conference on 10 June 2008, AC, Judgment of 21 October, 2008, ICC-01/04-
01/06-1486 21-10-2008 1/60 CB T OA13, paras 41 & 55, https://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc578371.pdf , 
last accessed on 3 April 2016; It has to be noted that the proceedings only resumed after the Appeals Chamber 
intervened and the information providers gave their consent to the Prosecution to proceed with the disclosure to 
the Chambers, Prosecutor –v- Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Reasons for Oral Decision Lifting the stay of proceedings, 
ICC-01/04-01/06-1644 23-01-2009 1/30 RH T, 23 January, 2009, para 13, https://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc622878.pdf , last accessed on 3 April, 2016. 
67 Prosecutor –v- Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Judgment on the Appeal of Mr. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo against the 
Decision on the Defence Challenge to the Jurisdiction of the Court pursuant to Article 19(2)(a) of the Statute, 
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fundamental human goods comprise right to fair trial concept that is broadly perceived and 
applied, embracing the judicial process in its entirety.68 It is suggested the entire judicial 
process includes administration of justice misconduct. That notwithstanding, a stay of 
proceedings is an extreme and drastic measure that should only be used as a last resort.69 The 
administration of justice offences is now focused on the broader considerations of competing 
interests in determining appropriate remedies70 for such conduct.71  This is a balancing 
approach72 to remedies that take into account the sensitivity of competing remedial interests of 
the trial.  Thus as opposed to drastic orders, the ICC can resort to alternative measures to cure 
OTP’s misconduct such as court-imposed sanctions and administrative sanctions. Court 
imposed sanctions can include a fine, warning or disqualification. Administrative sanctions 
comprise removal and disciplinary measures by the Assembly of States Parties (ASP),73 
investigations by an Independent Oversight Mechanism74 and internal disciplinary proceedings 
pursuant to the code of professional conduct for counsel, especially the OTP.75 The code of 
conduct has been criticized as flawed and ineffective self-regulation76 that does not fully meet 
                                                          
ICC-01/04-01/06-772 14-12-2006 1/22 CB PT OA4, 14 December, 2006, paras 36-39, http://www.legal-
tools.org/uploads/tx_ltpdb/doc243774_16.pdf, last accessed on 03 April, 2016. 
68 Prosecutor –v- Laurent Koudou Gbagbo, Judgment on the Appeal of Mr. Laurent Koudou Gbagbo against the 
decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I on Jurisdiction and Stay of the Proceedings, ICC-02/11-01/11-321 12-12-2012 
1/40 NM PT OA2, 12 December, 2012, paras 100-102, http://www.legal-tools.org/uploads/tx_ltpdb/2012-12--10-
31_1526463_03.PDF , last accessed on 03 April 2016. 
69 Prosecutor –v- Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Judgment on the appeal of the Prosecutor against the decision of Trial 
Chamber I of 8 July 2010 entitled "Decision on the Prosecution's Urgent Request for Variation of the  
Time-Limit to Disclose the Identity of Intermediary 143 or Alternatively to Stay Proceedings Pending Further 
Consultations with the VWU", AC, ICC-01/04-01/06-2582 08-10-2010 1/27 T OA18, 8 October, 2010, para 60, 
https://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc947768.pdf , last accessed on 4 April 2016. 
70 Prosecutor –v- Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Judgment on the appeal of Mr Thomas Lubanga Dyilo against his 
conviction, ICC-01/04-01/06-3121-Red 01-12-2014 1/193 NM A5, AC, 1 December 2014, paras 158-159, 
https://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1876833.pdf , last accessed on 03 April 2016. 
71 Chambers has evaluated evidence and its reliability, extent of damage and consequences on due proces s, 
Prosecutor –v- Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Judgment Pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute, ICC-01/04-01/06-2842 
14-03-2012 1/624 SL T, 14 March, 2012, paras 121-123, https://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1379838.pdf, 
last accessed on 03 April 2016. 
72 Turner, J.T, (2012) Policing International Prosecutors, 45 New York University Journal of International Law 
and Politics, p.183 
73 Article 46 of the Rome Statute; Rule 24 and 175 of the ICC RPE; Regulations of the Court 120 & 121 
74 Article 112(4) of the Rome Statute; Establishment of an Independent Oversight Mechanism, ICC-ASP/8/Res.1, 
https://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/Publications/Compendium/Resolution-Establishment-IOM-ENG.pdf, 
last accessed on 4 April 2016; Coleman, M, Feltz, M,  Oumopoulou, E,  Mubiru, S,  Rabatileva, Sayles, C, & 
Vikhre, A, (2011) Assessing the role of the independent oversight mechanism in enhancing the efficiency and 
economy of the ICC, Clinical Programme on Conflict, Human Rights and International Justice of the Utrecht Law 
Faculty, p.26, http://www.iilj.org/newsandevents/documents/iomfinalpaperaspublishedinotpwebsite.pdf, last 
accessed on 4 April 2016. 
 
75 The Prosecutor v. Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta, Decision on the Defence application concerning professional ethics 
applicable to prosecution lawyers, ICC-01/09-02/11-747 31-05-2013 1/13 RH T, 31 May 2013, para.10, 
https://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1599174.pdf, last accessed on 4 April 2016. 
76 Pacewicz, L, (2013) Introductory Note to International Criminal Court Code of Conduct for the Office of the 
Prosecutor, 53(2) International Legal Materials, pp.397-412. 
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the current needs to balance the powers and faculties of the Prosecutor as regards fair trial 
principles, credibility of the Court and sound administration of justice.77 Though this is the 
case, these remedies have been appraised as being in tandem with the postulation of fair trial 
rights of the accused person, less costly to other competing and legitimate goals of international 
criminal justice such as punishing international crimes, offering relief to victims and compiling 
a historical record.78 
 
Article 70 is aimed at preserving the integrity of judicial proceedings before the Court and 
proscribing behaviours suitable for such integrity.79Accordingly, the main guiding element of 
the offences in article 70 is the intention or mens rea of the accused person. This hovers over 
three conflated and distinct offence categories, namely:  (i) providing false testimony or 
presenting false evidence; (ii) Interference with witnesses; (iii) Offences by or against officials 
of the Court.80 A witness can be tried for intentionally giving false information or otherwise 
withholding information that is true.  It is a duty and obligation bestowed on a witness to aver 
the truth during court proceedings. The rationale behind it is the fact that such a person is under 
oath binding upon him or her to help the court come to a true and meaningful understanding of 
the matter before court.81 As regards the offence of “presenting evidence that the party knows 
is false or forged”, pursuant to article 70(1)(b) of the Statute, it has been held that the reference 
to “evidence” in this provision has to be construed so as to include all types of evidence such 
as documents, material and tangible objects, as well as oral evidence.82 Further, such evidence 
is deemed to be “presented” when it is introduced in the proceedings, thereby being made 
available to the parties, the participants and the Chamber.83 The expression a “party”, only 
refers to those who have the right to present evidence to a chamber in the course of proceedings 
                                                          
77 Oriolo, A, (2016) The ‘Inherent Power’ of Judges: An Ethical Yardstick to Assess Prosecutorial Conduct at the 
ICC, International Criminal Law Review, 10.1163/15718123-01602004, 
http://booksandjournals.brillonline.com/content/journals/10.1163/15718123-01602004 , last accessed on 4 April 
2016. 
78 Tuner, Policing International Prosecutors (n.66), p.183 
79 Prosecutor –v- Walter Osapiri Barasa, Warrant of Arrests, Under seal ex parte, only available to the Prosecutor 
and the Registrar, ICC-01/09-01/13-1-Red2 02-10-2013 2/20 NM PT, 2 August, 2013, para 20, https://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1650592.pdf, last accessed on 15 April 2016. 
80 Roberts, supra note 1, para 589; ‘Proposals submitted by the United States on Offences Against the Integrity of 
the Court’ UN Doc. A/AC.249/WP.41. 
81 Prosecutor v. Jean Pierre Bemba Gombo, Aime Kilolo Musamba, Jean-Jacques Mangenda Kabongo, Fidele 
Babala Wandu and Narcisse Arido, Decision pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute, ICC-01/05-
01/13-749 11-11-2014 11/55 EO PT, (PT I) Decision of 11 th November, 2014, para 28, http://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1857534.pdf , 20 September, 2015. 
82  Ibid, para 29 
83 Ibid 
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before the Court such as members of the Defence team and the accused.84 In addition, 
accessorial liability under article 25(3) (b)-(d) of the Statute may be incurred by any third 
person who does not have such capacity.85 This is applicable regardless of whether the Chief 
Prosecutor has proffered charges against an alleged direct perpetrator of the offence pursuant 
to article 25(3)(a) of the Statute.86 It has also been held that all types of evidence87 introduced 
in the proceedings, made available or presented to parties, actors or participants88 to an ICC 
trial process. It has to be noted that only those involved in the decision-making process namely 
right to audience.89 It is therefore submitted that this holding rules out NGOs as actors in as far 
as they are not presenting evidence before Court. Further, any such evidence that may have 
been adduced to investigators or intermediaries but has not been averred before the Chambers 
cannot be caught under this offence. 
 
 
Article 70(1) (c) of the Statute proscribes any conduct that may have (or is expected by the 
perpetrator to have) an impact or influence on the testimony to be given by a witness, inducing 
the witness to falsely testify or withhold information before the Court.90 Such relevant conduct 
should be aimed at ‘corruptly’ contaminating the witness’s testimony.91 It was therefore argued 
that the offence of corruptly influencing a witness is constituted independently from whether 
the pursued impact or influence is inchoate or actually achieved and must therefore be 
understood as a conduct crime, not a result crime.92 It has been held that it is possible to make 
payments within the domain of administrative reimbursements of expenses related to the 
conduct of defence investigations. However, such payments should be accompanied by specific 
and detailed explanations.93 It is suggested that the  impugned conduct should be that which 
taints the witness testimony and is independent of the goals pursued, whether such goals 
materialise or not. Further, in considering the offence, decision-makers should in their  
standpoints should consider that the offending act must be prompted by a corrupt motive. 
                                                          
84 Ibid 
85 ibid 
86 Ibid. 
87 Oral evidence, tangible or documentary. 
88 All those involved in the decision-making process such as The Chambers, OTP, Defence. 
89 Bemba Gombo Case, supra note 18, para 29. 
90 Ibid, para 30 
91 Ibid 
92 Prosecutor –v- Paul Gicheru and Philip Kipkoech Bett, Decision on the “Prosecution’s Application under 
Article 58(1) of the Rome Statute”, ICC-01/09-01/15-1-Red 10-09-2015 1/19 EK PT, para 19, https://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc2056890.pdf, last accessed on 13 April 2016. 
93 Ibid, paras 59-60. 
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Further, any legitimate doubts arising from the accused’s conduct must be resolved in favour 
of the accused person.94 
 
 
Witnesses that are alleged to have been corruptly influenced testify against the accused persons 
in the company of an ICC appointed lawyer. This lawyer is appointed pursuant to Rule 74 of 
the RPE to provide advice. Such advice is only limited to avoidance of self-incriminatory 
testimony.95 For purposes of their protection and circumstances, such testimony may be either 
in closed session or through video-link from an undisclosed location.96 A notification for such 
appointment of a lawyer is made by the ICC. For instance, Witness P-198 had a lawyer 
appointed from Kinshasa in DRC.97 Other laws in line with the same process include article 68 
of the Rome Statute, rule 21 of the RPE, regulations 23bis, 67 and 69 of the Regulations of the 
Court, regulation 123(1) of the Regulations of the Registry, and articles 5, 8 and 22(3) of the 
Code of Professional Conduct for counsel.  
 
 
Notwithstanding the above, it is suggested that the question as to whether the payments are 
excessive or prohibitive in accordance with the ICC practice or the practice of international 
criminal tribunals can be determined by so many factors processes. Policy and legislative 
framework of the ICC is silent on the VWU playing an oversight role in making or determining 
payments to witnesses during defence or prosecution investigations.98 From this, it can be 
derived that the VWU is not conversant with how much money the defence or the prosecution 
pays witnesses during investigations. However, it is suggested that reasonable payments or 
reimbursements are supposed to be made by a party as reimbursement costs incurred during 
                                                          
94 E. Sorensen, ‘Interference with Judicial Process’, 26 American Criminal Law Review (1988),  p. 901  
95 Rule 74 of the RPE 
96 Prosecutor v. Jean Pierre Bemba Gombo. Aimé Kilolo Musamba, Narcisse Arido, Jean-Jacques Mangenda 
Kabongo and Fidèle Babala Wandu,  Witness CAR-OTP-P-272 Transcripts, ICC-01/05-01/13-T-25-Red-ENG 
WT 21-10-2015 1/40 NB T, 21 October, 2015, https://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc2198709.pdf, last accessed 
on 20 April 2016. 
97Prosecutor v. Jean Pierre Bemba Gombo. Aimé Kilolo Musamba, Narcisse Arido, Jean-Jacques Mangenda 
Kabongo and Fidèle Babala Wandu,  Notification of the appointment of Mr Raphael Nyabirungu Mwene Songa 
as Legal Adviser to Witness P-0198, pursuant to Rule 74 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, ICC-01/05-
01/13-1406 21-10-2015 1/3 NM T, 20 October, 2015,  https://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc2089839.pdf , last 
accessed on 19 April 2016. 
98 Possibly the only exception to this is individuals within the witness protection program that are supposed to 
travel and meet investigators, Chapter 3 (Regulations 79-96) on Responsibilities of the Registrar Relating to 
victims and witnesses, Regulations of the Registry, ICC-BD/03-01-06, https://www.icc-
cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/A57F6A7F-4C20-4C11-A61F-759338A3B5D4/140149/ICCBD_030106_English1.pdf , 
last accessed on 17 April, 2016. 
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travel to interview locations and all other incidental costs.99 Such reasonable reimbursement 
may be compared to an average earning in the home country of the witness. However, it should 
never be an amount that can be viewed as an inducement or a pay-off to testify before Court. 
There is a special category of a witness suffering substantial economic loss100 as a result of 
testifying in the trial. This calls for an extra-ordinary allowance to be provided. Further, special 
witness needs such as school fees for children, help with commercial business, house 
maintenance have been considered as possible payments that VWU can weigh in depending on 
an evaluation of individual case to case basis of a witness.101 It has to be observed that lacuna 
in law as regards mandate of the VWU to parties to regulate how much to be paid to a witness 
during investigations makes it impossible for it to advise and enforce the use of unit’s same 
payment standards. Just as there is legal framework in place allowing the Chamber (through 
VWU arrangements) to regulate contacts between party and witnesses during their testimony, 
payments by both the defence and prosecution to witnesses during investigations need serious 
attention. This will preserve the integrity of the ICC justice system not to view witnesses as 
being influenced or induced by unreasonable sums of money. It will still be a challenge as to 
the definition of reasonable reimbursements since categories or factors processes for them 
cannot be easily closed. Witnesses in war crimes tribunal proceedings are precious 
commodities.102 Thus any modern and progressive criminal justice system should be able to 
completely take care of the human good for its witnesses,103 while properly balancing104 the 
same with fairness for the accused person. It is suggested that a policy-oriented approach and 
legal interpretation that considers reimbursements or payments that as good and dignifying for 
the witnesses, fair to both sides of the trial process and appraised on a case to case basis can be 
deemed to be reasonable reimbursements. 
 
                                                          
99 ICC policy and practice as per Witness Simo Matti Severi Väätänen, former head of the ICC’s VWU listed 
travel, accommodation, lodging, incidental allowances , pocket money to cater for other expenses related to the 
stays at a specific location during testimony, attendance allowance to compensate for the time and loss of earnings 
during a witness testimony while away from home, see also Wakabi, W, (15 March , 2016) Defense Lawyers’ 
Payments to Witnesses in Focus at ICC Trial, International Justice Monitor, 
http://www.ijmonitor.org/2016/03/defense-lawyers-payments-to-witnesses-in-focus-at-icc-trial/, last accessed on 
16 April 2016. 
100 For instance a farmer who during testimony he or she is supposed to be in his farm harvesting his or her crops.  
101 Bemba made such payments as schools fees for witness children, truck for commercial purposes,  house 
furniture, fence for a house of some of his witnesses,  
102 Wald, P, (2002) Dealing with Witnesses in War Crimes Trials: Lessons from the Yugoslavia Tribunals, 5 Yale 
Human Rights and Development Law Journal, p. 238. 
103 Kayuni, S, (2015) The ICC's Witness Protection Measures through the Lens of Policy-Oriented Jurisprudence, 
4(2) University College of London Journal of Law and Jurisprudence, p.271. 
104 McLaughlin, C,T. (2007) Victim and Witness Measures of the International Criminal Court: A Comparative 
Analysis, 6(1) The Law & Practice of International Courts and Tribunals , pp.189-220. 
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A person is guilty of tampering or interfering with a witness in two scenarios, if he or she 
knowing that the person is or is about to be called as a witness in an ongoing trial or 
proceedings.  Thus, it must be proven that such a person must have wrongfully induced or 
attempted to induce a witness to either absent himself or herself from trial, or otherwise to 
avoid or seek to avoid appearing or testifying at an ongoing trial or proceedings.105 Further, 
such an accused person must knowingly make any false statements or practices any fraud or 
deceit with intent to affect the testimony of such a witness. Elements of this particular offence 
include the intention to influence the witness or prospective witness, such an accused person 
offers, confers, or agrees to confer any benefit. It has been held elsewhere that coercing a 
witness to withhold any testimony information, document or thing is another form of 
interference as well.106 Further, an accused person can be charged with the offence if he or she 
coerces a witness to elude legal process summoning him or her to supply evidence, absent 
himself from official proceedings to which he has legally been summoned.107 It is submitted 
that categories of witness tampering or interference within the ambit of Article 70 are many 
and not closed. Dependent on technological advancements, creativity and craftiness of those 
appearing before the ICC, numerous ways may be devised for purposes of tampering with 
witnesses. It is therefore the duty upon decision-makers and participants within the Court to be 
steadfast and alert in translating policy relating to the administration of justice.108 It is suggested 
that such decision-makers should take a policy-oriented approach109 whereby dignity of 
witnesses, fulfilment of world community aspirations for justice, proscription of behaviour 
suitable to jeopardising integrity of the Court, preservation of order, certainty and integrity of 
judicial proceedings.110   Further, participants in judicial proceedings within the ICC need to 
be protected corrupt influence or intimidation by unscrupulous persons while they are about to 
or discharging their duty to the Court and world community. It is yet to be seen how Article 70 
will be applicable to lawyer-client privilege scenarios. Currently the ICC is grappling with 
lawyers who when advising witnesses that are about to appear before the Court, might have 
                                                          
105 United States v. Brand, 775 F.2d. 1460, 1465 (11th Circuit, 1985) 
106 United States v. Partin, 522 F.2d. 621, 641 (5th Circuit) 
107 See generally, Schleck, P., & Wright, G. ‘Interference with the Judicial Process’, 30 American Criminal Law 
Review, pp. 789-793 
108 M. McDougal et. al, ‘The World Constitutive Process of Administrative Decision’ 19(3) Journal of Legal 
Education, (1966-67),  p. 254 
109 H.D, Lasswell, M, McDougal, Jurisprudence in Policy-Oriented Perspective, 19 University of Florida Law 
Review, (1966), p. 486 
110 Walter Osapiri Barasa Case (n21) para 20. 
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obstructed the administration of justice.111 There is need to exercise discretion cautious as there 
is need to respect lawyer-client privilege. That notwithstanding, it is suggested that if at all a 
lawyer evidence points to the fact that a lawyer while advising or representing a witness went 
further than his legal mandate to corruptly offer bribes or facilitate bribes for purposes of 
defeating the course of justice, such a lawyer cannot later on plead protection from the lawyer-
client privilege. Such behaviour is beyond the realm of what lawyers do for clients. Thus 
decision-makers at the Court will have to come up with factor processes that would enable even 
handedness in respecting lawyer-client privilege while fighting the obstruction of justice. It 
will basically go to the mens rea and actus reus of the accused persons. 
 
Article 71 limits misconduct to Courtroom situations. Such situations include degree of control 
over recalcitrant witnesses, disruption of proceedings and deliberate refusal to comply with 
directions.112 It is suggested that such a section is difficult to cover misconduct emanating from 
outside the Courtroom. This is contrary to predecessor ad hoc tribunals where the Chambers 
could deal with behaviour outside the Courtroom. An example is the case of Hartmann in the 
ICTY113 where the accused, a former spokesperson of ICTY Prosecutor was fined 7, 000 Euros 
for publicly disclosing a confidential legal reasoning behind a controversial decision made by 
the tribunal on an ongoing trial. If at all the ICC decides to execute Article 71 for such purposes 
as misconduct relating to publication of reasoning behind controversial decision or exercise of 
discretion within the Court, cautious process needs to be undertaken by decision-makers.  It is 
submitted that the ICC is viewed as a paradigm for democracy and human good. Thus 
transparency of the OTP in exercise of discretion or policy direction needs to be paramount. It 
is morally damaging for the ICC authority to stifle palpable public interest served by any such 
publication. The primary pursuit of human good in form of truth and justice should not be 
compromised in order to pursue other fundamental purposes or ideals. Thus such a punishment 
of an ICC official on the basis of a publication would be inconsonant with the Court’s pursuit 
for justice and end of impunity. Further, sanctions provided under Article 71 are a proper 
mechanism by which the Trial Chamber could maintain control of proceedings.114 This can as 
                                                          
111 Gicheru and Bett Case (n 21) 
112 SN Ngane The Position of Witnesses Before the International Criminal Court  (Leiden, Koninklikje Brill, 
2013), pp. 329 -330; see also O Trifferer ‘Article 71, Sanctions for Misconduct before the Court’ in O Trifferer 
(Ed.) Commentary on the Observers Notes, Article by Article ( Verlag Beck, 2008), pp. 1347-1360. 
113 Prosecutor –v- Hartmann, (IT-02-54-R77.5 A) In the Case Against Florence Hartmann (Judgment) 19 July 
2011, http://www.icty.org/x/cases/contempt_hartmann/acjug/en/110719_judgement_hartmann.pdf accessed on 
22 October 2015. 
114 Prosecutor –v- Thomas Lubanga Dyilo Judgment on the appeal of the Prosecutor against the decision of Trial 
Chamber I of 8 July 2010 entitled "Decision on the Prosecution's Urgent Request for Variation of the Time-Limit 
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well extend to control of the conduct of the Prosecutor as recourse to sanctions enables the 
Court to execute tools available within the trial process to ensure the underlying obstacles to a 
fair trial, speedy trial and conclusion of trial on merits are adhered to. Therefore, it is submitted 
that a trail Chamber visited upon with a conduct that borders on deliberate refusal to comply 
with its orders threatens human good, i.e. fairness of the trial. Such Chambers should seek to 
bring about such party’s compliance through the imposition of sanctions under Article 71. 
 
C. The Problem of Subpoena Testimonies 
Notwithstanding the ICC offences against administration of justice, there is a serious challenge 
as regards enforcement. The ICC’s policy and legal framework lacks the subpoena powers to 
seriously enforce the international criminal justice system.115 Witnesses or persons that fail to 
follow Court’s directions or offend its trial integrity are unlikely to be sanctioned pursuant to 
Article 71 of the Rome Statute.116 It symbolises a huge weakness and biggest threat to an 
effective and functioning trial process at the Court.117 Sluiter has observed that the omission of 
the subpoena powers were part of a deliberate compromise at Rome among the states against 
and in favour of a powerful Court.118 Fair trial rights of the accused person and truth-finding 
processes before the Court have been gravely affected by this omission.119 It is a non-derogable 
right for the witnesses not to appear and give testimony before the Chambers. Ngane has 
interpreted it as an ICC legal framework enshrining voluntary appearance principle.120 The 
International Bar Association (IBA) has observed this voluntariness factor within the ICC 
witness system fails to meet expectations of potential witnesses and creates additional resource 
pressure and strain on the OTP’s shoe-string budget.121  That notwithstanding, Khan and Dixon 
                                                          
to Disclose the Identity of Intermediary 143 or Alternatively to Stay Proceedings Pending Further Consultations 
with the VWU" (AC) ICC-01/04-01/06-2582 08-10-2010 1/27 T OA18, Decision of 8 October 2010, para 60, 
http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc947768.pdf accessed on 22 September 2015. 
115 Kress, C. & Prost, K, (2008) Article 93 in Triffterer, O. (Ed.) Commentary in the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court – Observers’ Notes, Article by Article, Munich, Beck/Hart, p.1576. 
116 Sluiter, G, (2009) “I Beg You, Please Come Testify"——The Problematic Absence of Subpoena Powers at the 
ICC, 12(4) Journal of New Criminal Law Review: In International and Interdisciplinary, pp.590-608. 
117 Mazurek, A, (2008) Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo: The International Criminal Court as It Brings Its 
First Case to Trial, 86 University of Detroit Mercy Law Review, p.535. 
118 Sluiter, G, (2010) Appearance of Witnesses and unavailability of subpoena powers for the Court, in Bellelli, 
R, (Ed.) International Criminal Justice: Law and Practice from the Statute to its Review, Surrey, Ashgate, pp. 461-
466. 
119 Ibid 
120 Ngane, S, (2011) Should States Bear Responsibility of Imposing Sanctions on Its Citizens Who as Witnesses 
Commit Crimes Before the ICC? in Henham, R.J, & Findlay, M, (Eds.) Exploring the Boundaries of International 
Criminal Justice, Surrey, Ashgate Publishing, p.143. 
121 IBA, (July, 2013) Witnesses before the International Criminal Court : An International Bar Association 
International Criminal Court Programme report on the ICC’s efforts and challenges to protect, support and ensure 
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have argued that non-appearance of a witness is not per se an offence against the ICC 
administration of justice.122 Concept of voluntary means no more than a formal instrument of 
compulsion (such as a subpoena). It however does not mean that there exists an absence of 
compulsion.123 Principle of voluntary appearance has been confirmed by other ICC Chambers 
in Lubanga124 and Kenyan125 Cases. A states party can possibly impose sanctions on a witness 
for offences against administration of justice.126 This is an obligation127 and shared 
responsibility of the world community in international criminal justice. In a nutshell, ICC 
policy formulation and legal interpretation128 on subpoenas should deem states parties as 
having a broader duty to comply with the ICC’s requests.129  
 
 
ICC Chambers has recently has attempted to interpret its subpoena powers. In the case of 
Prosecutor –v- Ruto and Sang,130 the Prosecution had requested the Chamber to summon 8 
witnesses that were either no longer cooperating with the Prosecution or had informed the 
Prosecution that they were no longer willing to testify.131  In considering both general 
international law and provisions of the Rome Statute, the Trial Chamber V(A) held that the 
Rome Statute States Parties did not intend to create an ICC that is ‘in terms a substance, in 
                                                          
the rights of witnesses, IBAHRI Trust, p.16, http://www.ibanet.org/Article/Detail.aspx?ArticleUid=4470A96B-
C4FA-457F-9854-CE8F6DA005ED, last accessed on 17 April 2016. 
122 Khan, K, & Dixon, R, (2005) Archibold, International Criminal Courts: Practice and Evidence, Thomson, 
Sweet & Maxwell, p.138. 
123 Zahar, A, (2009) International Court and Private Citizen, 12(4) New Criminal Law Review: In International 
and Interdisciplinary Journal, p.587. 
124 Prosecutor -v- Dyilo Lubanga, Transcript of 20 May, 2011, ICC-01/04-01/06-T-355-ENG ET, p.5, para 19, 
https://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1077412.pdf, last accessed on 13 April 2016. 
125 Kenyan Situation, Second Decision on Application by Nine Persons to Questioned by the Office of the 
Prosecutor, 31 January, 2011, ICC-01/09-39, para 20, https://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1011657.pdf, last 
accessed on 14 April 2016. 
126 Ngane, Should States Bear Responsibility of Imposing Sanctions on Its Citizens Who as Witnesses Commit 
Crimes Before the ICC? (n.6), p.143 
127 See generally, Sluiter, G, (2002) International Criminal Adjudication and the Collection of Evidence: 
Obligations of States, Antwerp, Oxford. 
128 Article 93(1)(b) of the Rome Statute 
129 Ngane, S.N, (2013) The Position of Witnesses Before the International Criminal Court, Leiden, Brill Nijhoff, 
p.262. 
130 Prosecutor –v- William Samoei Ruto and Joshua Sang, Decision on Prosecutor’s Application for Witness 
Summonses and Resulting Request for State Party Cooperation, ICC-01/09-01/11-1274-Corr2 30-04-2014 1/78 
NM T, 17 April, 2014, Trial Chamber V(A), https://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1771401.pdf , last accessed 
on 13 April 2016. 
131 Prosecutor –v- William Samoei Ruto and Joshua Sang, Corrected and amended version of “Prosecution’s 
request under article 64(6)(b) and article 93 to summon witnesses” (ICC-01/09-01/11-1120-Conf-Exp), 
Prosecution Summonses Request, ICC-01/09-01/11-1120-Red2-Corr, paras 1, 5, 62, https://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1694953.pdf , last accessed on 13 April 2016; Supplementary Request, ICC-01/09-01/11-
1188-Conf-Red, paras 2-3. 
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truth a phantom’.132 Rather, they must be presumed to have created a court with every necessary 
competence, power, ability and capability to exercise its functions and fulfil its mandate in an 
effective way. These include the power to subpoena witnesses. Therefore, it is suggested in this 
article that ICC’s entire dependence on the inclination of witness voluntary appearance would 
be holding the Court to the whims, witness’ continued goodwill, peril and mercy of external 
forces. Functions and powers of the Trial Chamber include a compulsive requirement that:  
 
In performing its functions prior to trial or during the course of a trial, the Trial Chamber may, 
as necessary: 
(b)     Require the attendance and testimony of witnesses and production of documents 
and other evidence by obtaining, if necessary, the assistance of States as provided in 
this Statute;133 (Emphasis added). 
These are powers accorded to the ICC to compel witnesses to appear before it,134 or pursuant 
to Article 93(1) (b) of the Rome Statute, the Court may request a State Party to compel 
witnesses to appear before the Court in Situ in the State Party’s territory or by way of video-
link. Therefore, just as national criminal justice systems have provisions that enable national 
courts to subpoena testimonies, the ICC Chambers presiding over offences that destroy public 
order and shock the conscience of humanity. Thus as opposed to ‘voluntary appearance 
principle’135 enshrined in Articles 93(1)(e) and 93(7), the Rome statute grants compulsion 
powers to subpoena testimonies while ensuring that there is sufficient evidence, expeditious 
and fair trial procedures.  The intention of the framers of the Rome Statute was not to deny 
subpoena powers to the ICC. In that connection, the Chamber found that there is unity among 
international law, the Rome Statute, the Constitution of Kenya and the laws of Kenya 
concerning its dealings with the ICC.136 It was found that the Government of Kenya has an 
                                                          
132 Prosecutor –v- William Samoei Ruto and Joshua Sang, Decision on Prosecutor’s Application for Witness 
Summonses and Resulting Request for State Party Cooperation, ICC-01/09-01/11-1274-Corr2 30-04-2014 1/78 
NM T, 17 April, 2014, Trial Chamber V(A), https://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1771401.pdf , last accessed 
on 13 April 2016. 
133 Article 64(6)(b) of the Rome Statute; Ibid, paras 100-101. 
134 Prosecutor –v- William Samoei Ruto and Joshua Sang, Judgment on the appeals of William Samoei Ruto and 
Mr Joshua Arap Sang against the decision of Trial Chamber V (A) of 17 April 2014 entitled "Decision on 
Prosecutor's Application for Witness Summonses and resulting Request for State Party Cooperation", Dated 9 
October, 2014, AC,  ICC-01/09-01/11-1598 09-10-2014 1/50 EK T OA7 OA8, https://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1847142.pdf , last accessed on 14 April 2016. 
135 Ngane, S, Supra (note 97), p.143. 
136 Prosecutor –v- William Samoei Ruto and Joshua Sang, Decision on Prosecutor’s Application for Witness 
Summonses and Resulting Request for State Party Cooperation, ICC-01/09-01/11-1274-Corr2 30-04-2014 1/78 
NM T, 17 April, 2014, Trial Chamber V(A), paras 102-124, 174-175, https://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1771401.pdf , last accessed on 13 April 2016. 
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obligation to cooperate fully with the Court: by serving the subpoenas to the witnesses and by 
assisting in compelling their attendance before the Chamber, by the use of compulsory 
measures as necessary.137 Further, Trial Chamber V(a) directed the Registry of the Court to 
prepare and transmit a cooperation request to the Republic of Kenya for: (i) the service of 
summonses by the Government of Kenya on the eight witnesses, (ii) assistance in compelling 
and ensuring the eight witnesses’ appearance before the Chamber by video-link or before the 
Chamber convened on the territory of Kenya and (iii) the Government of Kenya to make 
appropriate arrangements for the security of the eight witnesses until they appear before the 
Court.138 Contrary to this, the dissenting opinion of Judge Herrerra Carbuccia shed more light 
on Article 64(6)(b). The judge held that though the Rome Statute grants the powers to the ICC 
to compel witness appearance pursuant to Article 64(6)(b), there is no mechanism to make an 
individual liable for refusing to testify.139 The Rome Statute’s administration of justice offences 
do not contemplate this kind of contempt making subpoena powers absent.140 Appraising Judge 
Carbuccia’s dissent, it is suggested this is flawed reasoning. In as far as offences against the 
administration of justice are silent on this contemptuous conduct, legal and policy-oriented 
approach should point to a Court with general powers to punish any misconduct or offences 
during trial.141  No Court would grant judges all powers except inherent jurisdiction to 
coordinate and manage the conduct of trials. It is argued that there exists a direct obligation for 
the summoned witness to the Court.142 Failure to fulfil such subpoena obligations exposes one 
to the liability of criminal sanctions within the inherent powers of the Court.143 However, it is 
further suggested that for purposes of avoiding any doubts, the ICC RPE should be amended 
in order to give room for clear policy formulation and legal interpretation for these stipulated 
powers. 
 
D.  Past Trends in Administration of Justice Offences 
                                                          
137 Ibid; Judge Herrerra Carbuccia in his dissenting option disagrees with this, paras 14-20 
138 Ruto Decision, Trial Chamber V(A) 
139 Prosecutor –v- William Samoei Ruto and Joshua Sang, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Herrerra Carbuccia on 
the Decision on Prosecutor’s Application for Witness Summonses and Resulting Request for State Party 
Cooperation, ICC-01/09-01/11-1274-Corr2 30-04-2014 1/78 NM T, 29 April, 2014, Trial Chamber V(A), paras 
10-12, https://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1757148.pdf , last accessed on 13 April 2016. 
140 Ibid 
141 ICC Regulation 29(1) (n49) 
142 Sluitter, G, (2009) ‘I beg you please come to testify’- The Problematic absence of Subpoena Powers at the 
ICC, p.592 
143 ICC Regulation 29(1) and 29(2) (n49) 
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It is trite that the ICC structure as regards its prosecutorial mandate couched in Articles 70 and 
71 of the Rome Statute, heavily weighs-in the way the Chief Prosecutor conducts himself in 
terms of policy considerations. Thus as a decision-maker the Chief Prosecutor should be 
cautious at handling policy dilemmas by not complicating legalistic mission of the Court, 
namely achieving justice. Decisions should be purely based on the interests of justice even if it 
means investigating and prosecuting the OTP team or its intermediaries. It is suggested that 
strategies employed by decision-makers as regards discretionary powers pursuant to offences 
against the administration of justice should be fair and just. It must be an interpretation of law 
coupled with a conflation of policy reflecting the aspirations144 of the negotiators at Rome. The 
current conduct of the OTP seriously undermines the very foundations and legitimacy 
standards that the court was built on. Notwithstanding numerous allegations, criticisms about 
conduct that falls afoul to administration of justice offending, only two cases145  have been 
before the Court since its inception on 1st July, 2002. Thus it is submitted that the relaxed and 
timid approach in effecting Articles 70 and 71 has probably seen an increase in the unfortunate 
conduct of, inter alia,  witness tampering and interference among the ICC witnesses.146 The 
fact that the ICC continues to open new situations, cases or investigations means that such 
conduct will continue cropping up unless something is done urgently. It is not a question of 
option for the actors and decision-makers within the Court to continuously apply scant 
approach to the expectations of those that carved Articles 70 and 71 into the statute. They are 
the duty bearers and they are expected to execute the provisions in accordance with the 
aspirations dreamed at Rome. Throughout the negotiating process, the question of prosecutorial 
authority proved a major point of dispute.147 Even after the process, prosecutorial discretion 
                                                          
144 O. Hathaway,‘The Continuing influence of the New Haven School,’  32 Yale Journal of International Law 
(2007), p.558. 
145 Prosecutor v. Walter Osapiri Barasa, ICC-01/09-01/13, http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1650592.pdf 
(last accessed on 02/05/2015); Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Aime Kilolo Musamba, Jean-Jacques 
Mangenda Kabongo, Fidele Babala Wandu and Narcisse Arido , ICC-01/05-01/13, http://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1857534.pdf  accessed on 22 September 2015. 
146 T. Escritt, ‘Slain ICC Witness involved in Witness Tampering scheme – prosecutors,’ (2015) 
http://uk.reuters.com/article/2015/01/09/uk-kenya-courts-idUKKBN0KI1OA20150109  accessed on 22 
September 2015.; Magdaleno, J. (2015) Disappearance of Key Witness Raises Concerns Over Tampering in ICC 
Kenya Case, https://news.vice.com/article/disappearance-of-key-witness-raises-concerns-over-tampering-in-icc-
kenya-case accessed on 23 September 2015. 
147 See generally, Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of International Criminal 
Court, June 15 -July 17, 1998, Draft Statute of the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International 
Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.183/2/Add.1 (1998) [hereinafter "Final PrepCom Draft Statute"]. 
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has proven to be a pinnacle for international criminal courts148 judicial processes resulting in 
calls for rational ethical and legal consideration in decision-making.149  
 
Numerous opportunities can be tapped from how predecessor international criminal tribunals 
have grappled with offices against the administration of justice. It is submitted that mostly, 
such experiences have been a learning curve for the tribunals. This has been due to their 
mandates and arena of operation. It is suggested that within these ad hoc and internationalized 
tribunals, having offences against the administration of justice within the RPE meant that such 
issues were not very well evident. They did not properly serve human good. For instance, in 
the ICTY ad hoc tribunal’s case of Tadic benefitted from the overzealous defence that 
disregarded court’s protective measures to unveil misconduct or lack of truthfulness thereof by 
some witnesses. It was all blamed on the general failure of the prosecution to test adequately 
the truthfulness of evidence or its diligence.150 Apart from witness misconduct or tampering, 
intimidation during the Prosecutor v. Haradinaj Case proved problematic as fear was instilled 
in witnesses who wanted to step forward and testify against the accused person. The ICTY had 
difficulties in extracting plausible evidence from such witnesses.151 This probably led to 
travesty of justice. Other instances before the ICTY that culminated into offences against the 
administration of justice included the Lukic Case concerning bribery to witnesses,152 Vojislave 
Seselj Case153 concerning flouting of protective measures through publication of witnesses 
information. 
 
                                                          
148 See generally, M.R, Brubacher, ‘Prosecutorial Discretion within the International Criminal Court,’ 2(1) 
Journal of International Criminal Justice (2004), pp 71-95; L. Côté,  ‘Reflections on the Exercise of Prosecutorial 
Discretion in International Criminal Law,’ 3(1) Journal of International Criminal Justice (2005), pp.162-186; 
A.S, Weiner,  ‘Prudent Politics: The International Criminal Court, International Relations, and Prosecutorial 
Independence,’  12 Washington University Global Studies Law Review (2013), p. 545 
149 A. Sarvarian,‘Ethical Standards for Prosecution and Defence Counsel before International Courts: The Legacy 
of Nuremberg,’ 10 Journal of International Criminal Justice (2012), pp. 423-446. 
150 Prosecutor v. Tadic, Judgement, Case No. IT-94-1-T, 7 May 1997, paras. 553–554, 
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/tadic/tjug/en/tad-tsj70507JT2-e.pdf  accessed on 20 September 2015. 
151 Prosecutor v. Haradinaj, Balaj and Brahimaj, Judgement, Case No. IT-04–84-A, 19 July 2010, paras 23-28, 
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/haradinaj/acjug/en/100721.pdf accessed on 22 September 2015.; see also Prosecutor 
v. Limaj, Bala and Musliu, Judgement, Case No. IT-03–66-T, 30November 2005, 
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/limaj/tjug/en/lim-tj051130-e.pdf  accessed on 20 September 2015.; Prosecutor v. 
Boskoski and Tarculovski, Judgement, Case No. IT-04–82-T, 10 July 2008, para. 14, 
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/boskoski_tarculovski/acdec/en/090416a.pdf accessed on 22 September 2015. 
152 Prosecutor v. Rasic, Judgement, Case No. IT-98–32/l-R77.2-A, 16 November 2012, 
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/contempt_rasic/acjug/en/121116_judgement.pdf accessed on 22 September 2015. 
153 Prosecutor v. Seselj, Public Version of the Judgement Issued 30May 2013, Case No. IT-03-67-R77.4-A, 20 
May 2013, http://icty.org/x/cases/contempt_seselj3/acjug/en/130530_judgement.pdf accessed on 22 September 
2015. 
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The ICTR has had its own share of allegations of offences against the administration of justice. 
Contrary to the ICTY, this has not been so prominent. The case of Prosecutor v. Bizimingu, 
Mugenzi, Bikamumpaka and Mugiraneza had the defence raise serious allegations of the 
Rwandan government tampering with its witnesses. It was alleged that there was a ploy to 
dissuade witnesses from testifying in favour of the defendants through harassment and 
evidence fabrications.154 Further, there were allegations that the Rwandan government agents 
heavily influenced what witnesses were to say before the Tribunal through threats and other 
methods that instilled fear and trepidation among the witnesses.155 It is submitted that the case 
to case basis approach to analysis of any contempt of court or tampering allegations was a 
brilliant approach by the ICTR.156 That notwithstanding, holding that the trial process was fair 
just because allegations of evidence fabrications and witnesses intimidation had not stopped 
the defence from having access to the witnesses is flawed.157 Thus it is submitted that witness 
tampering or intimidation comes in all forms. There are times when a witness can be tampered 
with or intimidated or even coached to fabricate a story, collusion and yet avail himself or 
herself for the defence with an inept story. Further to this, there are times when even mere 
access to information leading to proof that there exists evidence fabrication, witness 
intimidation and collusion has been denied to the defence.158 It is therefore flawed to conclude 
that access to intimidated witnesses by the defence equals fair trial. If the process is faulty then 
the resultant effects will not be for human good. There will not be any fair trial.  
 
The hybrid courts such as the SCSL had its own mishaps with offences against the 
administration of justice. The Independent Counsel had brought proceedings against Brima 
Samura for disclosure of an identity of one of the protected witnesses to one of the wives of 
the defendants leading to serious allegations of post-testimony intimidation. The question of 
                                                          
154 Prosecutor v. Bizimingu, Mugenzi, Bikamumpaka and Mugiraneza, Judgement, Case No. ICTR-99-50-T, 30 
September 2011, paras. 108–110, http://www.unictr.org/sites/unictr.org/files/case-documents/ictr-99-50/trial-
judgements/en/110930.pdf accessed on 21 Setember 2015. 
155 Prosecutor v. Simba, Judgement, Case No. ICTR-01-76-T, 13 December 2005, para 41, 
https://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/ICTR/SIMBA_ICTR-01-76/SIMBA_ICTR-01-76-T.pdf accessed on 22 
September 2015. 
156 Mugiraneza Defence Motion pertaining to allegations of contempt resulting from alleged defence witness 
harassment. See Confidential Decision on Request to Initiate Contempt Proceedings (TC), 19 th August, 2011.  
157 Bizimungu Case, Op. Cit,  paras 108-110. 
158 Justin Mugenzi and Prosper Mugaraneza v. Prosecutor, ICTR -99-50A, (Appeal Chamber), Decision on 
Jacques Mungwarere’s Motion for Access to Confidential Material, Decision of 24th May, 2012, 
http://www.worldcourts.com/ictr/eng/decisions/2012.05.24_Mugenzi_v_Prosecutor.pdf accessed on 22nd 
September 2015. 
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whether the accused person had relevant mens rea played a crucial role to the proceedings.159 
Disclosure of confidential information as an offence resurfaced again in Taylor Case. On an 
inadvertent disclosure of protected witnesses’ details by the defence, Prosecution brought 
contempt of court proceedings against defence lawyers for violations of Rules 77(A) (ii) and 
77(B) of the SCSL RPE and misconduct pursuant to Rule 46 of the same RPE.160 In arguing 
its case, the prosecution averred that it was the duty of all actors before court to act with 
competence, honesty, skill and professionalism that would preserve the integrity of the court 
process and not bring the administration of justice into disrepute.161 Thus in considering such 
offences against the administration of justice, mens rea plays a crucial role in decision-making. 
Without it is like turning such trials into strict liability offences. 162 It is submitted that such 
terms as knowingly and wilfully are conjunctive in nature. Offence allegations that stem from 
inadvertent actions are highly unlikely to meet the mens rea threshold of knowing and wilful 
interference with administration of justice.163 Thus pattern of conduct or behaviour should be 
that which is tantamount to evidence that is probative of intent to knowingly and wilfully 
interfere with the administration of justice.164 Dissection of the animus of the accused during 
the commission of the offence will readily help in considering whether such a person conducted 
himself or herself inadvertently or it was a knowing and wilful act or omission.165  
 
Another court that has been dodged with offences against administration of justice is the STL. 
It is suggested that the sensitivity and nature of how the court came into effect has heavily 
contributed to the performance of the court. Thus probably leaking of details of prosecution 
witnesses has had its toll on the court.166 Considering the conflict of interest likely to arise 
                                                          
159 Independent Counsel v. Brima, Samura Judgment in Contempt Proceedings, SCSL-2005-01, 26 October 2005, 
http://www.rscsl.org/Documents/Decisions/Contempt/2005-01/18/SCSL-05-01-18.pdf accessed on 22 
September 2015.; see also Independent Counsel v. Bangura, Kargbo, Kanu and Kamara, Judgment in Contempt 
Proceedings, SCSL-2011-2-T, http://www.rscsl.org/Documents/Decisions/Contempt/2011-02/024/SCSL-11-02-
PT-024.pdf accessed on 22 September 2015. 
160 In the Matter of Contempt Proceedings Arising from the Case of The Prosecutor v. Charles Ghankay Taylor, 
(TC II), SCSL-12-01-T, Judgment in Contempt Proceedings, Decision of 19 th October, 2012, 
http://www.rscsl.org/Documents/Decisions/Contempt/2012-01/SCSL-12-01-T-012.PDF accessed on 20 
September 2015. 
161 Ibid, paras 8-11. 
162 Charles Taylor Case, paras 37-39. 
163 Prosecutor v. Nshogoza, ICTR-07-91-T, Judgment, 7th July, 2009, para 176, 
http://www.worldcourts.com/ictr/eng/decisions/2009.07.07_Prosecutor_v_Nshogoza.pdf  accessed on 21 
September 2015. 
164 Charles Taylor case, para 44 
165 Ibid, paras 39-45 
166 Tribunal to Launch Investigation in Alleged Witness Intimidation’, STL press release, 29 April 2013, 
http://www.stl-tsl.org/en/news-and-press/press-releases/2278-29-04-2013-tribunal-to-launch-investigation-in-
alleged-witness-intimidation accessed on 21 September 2015. 
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within the office of the Prosecutor, overburdening the office of prosecutor and pursuant to the 
principle justice must be seen to be done, the RPE allowed a person other than the prosecutor 
to be appointed as amicus curiae to investigate such an offence against administration of 
justice.167  It is thus submitted that the recognition of likely conflict of interest arising from the 
very office of the prosecutor as regards offences against the administration of justice serves 
optimum order within the court. The decision-making process in as far it is not just cannot avail 
a result that will be seen in the public eye as justice. Thus mandating prosecution to investigate 
an offence emanating from administration of justice is faulty. Legal and policy considerations 
should point towards attainment of independence in this process. 
 
As regards subpoena powers, past trends of the internationalized tribunals such as the ICTY 
and ICTR have demonstrated that courts were empowered to issue subpoenas to witnesses for 
purposes of an investigation, or preparation or testimony during trial. Such subpoena powers 
were being issued by the Trial Chamber when it is necessary for the purposes of an 
investigation or for the preparation or conduct of the trial.168 Therefore, any witness was liable 
to direct summons and subpoena for purposes or testimony before the tribunals. Failure to 
adhere to such summons and subpoena was deemed contemptuous misconduct of knowingly 
and wilfully interfering with the tribunals’ administration of justice with fine or imprisonment 
sanctions as a resultant effect.169 In terms of cooperation, the UN backed tribunals thrived on 
the backdrop of primacy and cooperation of national jurisdictions170 as opposed to the Rome 
                                                          
167 Prosecutor v. Salim Jamil Ayyash, Mustfa Amine Badreddine, Hussein Hassan Oneissi, Assad Hassan Sabra, 
Public Redacted Version of Decision on Allegations of Contempt, STL-11-01, 29th April, 2013, (PT), 
http://www.stl-tsl.org/en/the-cases/stl-11-01/filings/stl1101-key-filings/2277-f0021__r60bis accessed on 22 
September 2015. 
168 Article 19(2) of the Statute of the ICTY; Article 18(2) of the Statute of the ICTR; Rule 54 of the ICTY RPE; 
Rule 54 of the ICTR RPE;  see also tribunal jurisprudence in Prosecutor –v- Radovan Karadzic, IT-95-5/18-T, 
Decision on Accused’s Motion to Subpoena Zdravko Tolimir, (9 May 2013), TC, 
www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/tdec/en/130509.pdf, last accessed on 16 April 2016 ; Prosecutor –v- Radovan 
Karadzic, IT-95-5/18-AR73.11, Decision on Appeal Against The Decision on the Accused’s Motion to Subpoena 
Zdra Vko Tolimir, AC , 13 November 2013, http://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/acdec/en/131113.pdf, last 
accessed on 16 April 2016;  Prosecutor –v- Halilovic, , IT-0 1-48-AR73, Decision on the Issuance of Subpoenas, 
(21 June 2004), AC, para 5, www.icty.org/x/cases/halilovic/acdec/en/040621.htm , last accessed on 14 April 2016; 
Prosecutor v Krstic, IT-98-33-A. Decision on Application for Subpoenas, (1 July,2003), AC, para 10, 
www.icty.org/x/cases/krstic/acdec/en/030701.htm, last accessed on 15 April 2016; There is also ICTR case law 
namely, Prosecutor – v - Kanyarukiga, ICTR-2002-78-R11bis, Decision on Prosecutor’s Request for Referral to 
the Republic of Rwanda, (6 June 2008), TC, http://www.ictrcaselaw.org/docs/20080606-dco-0278-01-en.pdf, last 
accessed on 14 April 2016 ; Prosecutor -v - Kanyarukiga, ICTR-2002-78-R11bis, Decision on the Prosecution’s 
Appeal against Decision on Referral under Rule 11bis, (30 October 2008), AC, 
http://www.ictrcaselaw.org/docs/20081030-dco-0278-01-en.pdf, last accessed on 14 April 2016. 
169 See Rules 77(A)(iii) and 77(G) of ICTY Rules; Rules 77(A)(iii) and 77(G) of ICTR Rules 
170 Article 9(2) of the ICTY Statute; Article 8(2) of the ICTR Statute 
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Statute legal regime that is only complementary to the national systems.171 Notwithstanding 
this, Brouwer has argued that although tribunals have measures at their disposal to sanction 
individuals breaching protection orders, the question remains as to how big the problem of 
witness interference really is and how to address the issue adequately.172 
 
 
E.  Future Trends Projections and Policy Alternatives 
The investigations pursuant to Articles 70 and 71 are a special category. Overall initiation of 
an investigation espoused in Article 53 and any other rules thereunder are not applicable.173 
The Pre-trial Chamber may in its discretion make any of the determinations set forth in pursuant 
to conformation of charges on the basis of written submissions, without hearing, unless the 
interests of justice otherwise require.174 It is suggested that the experience of international 
criminal proceedings has proven that it is much easier for the prosecution to gather 
incriminating evidence than it is for the defence to collect exculpatory material.175 It is further 
suggested that such discretion must at all times be exercised sparingly. This is so because 
charges against administration of justice are criminal in nature and have the potential of 
restricting liberty of the accused person. Unless the same has been waived by the accused 
person, confirming charges based on written submissions and without a hearing is an affront to 
fair trial, procedurally flawed and a travesty of justice. It is within the rights of the accused 
person176 and an indication of a progressive criminal procedural process for an accused person 
to be accorded the opportunity through himself or his counsel to object to the charges, challenge 
the evidence presented by the Prosecutor and present own evidence. A Trial Chamber may in 
its discretion order that there be a joinder of charges under Article 70 with charges under 
Articles 5 to 8.177 
 
                                                          
171 Prosecutor –v- William Samoei Ruto and Joshua Sang, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Herrerra Carbuccia on 
the Decision on Prosecutor’s Application for Witness Summonses and Resulting Request for State Party 
Cooperation, ICC-01/09-01/11-1274-Corr2 30-04-2014 1/78 NM T, 29 April, 2014, Trial Chamber V(A), paras 
10-12, https://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1757148.pdf , last accessed on 16 April 2016. 
172 Brouwer, A.M, (2015) The Problem of Witness Interference before International Criminal Tribunals, 15(4) 
International Criminal Law Review, pp.700-732. 
173 Rule 165(2) of the ICC RPE 
174 Rule 165(3) of the ICC RPE 
175 S. Swoboda,‘ICC Disclosure Regime - A Defence Perspective,’ 19 Criminal Law Forum (2008), p. 450. 
176 Rule 165(3) of the ICC RPE 
177 Rule 165(4) of the ICC RPE 
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A further analysis of prosecutorial discretion on the overall powers of the Chief Prosecutor 
points to the sole investigatory and prosecutorial powers under Article 70 of the Rome Statute 
bestowed on the OTP. Thus only the Chief Prosecutor who can legally initiate investigations 
related to these offences against administration of justice.178 The framers deliberately accorded 
discretion to the Chief Prosecutor to initiate and conduct investigations on the basis of 
information communicated by the Chamber or any other reliable source.179 It has been argued 
by scholars that prosecutorial discretion that is so unclear as regards its legality, has the likely 
result of being chaotic.180  It is suggested that this is especially so when the existing rules do 
not clearly clarify whom to investigate and indict. The Rome Statute’s offences against the 
administration of justice mirror this serious challenge. Thus it has been argued that it falls 
within the realm or purview of the Prosecutor to develop ex ante rules or guidelines that mirror 
quality of law.181 Where the Prosecutor falls short of this, the judges are likely to step in and 
direct or guide the Prosecutor through their interpretation of the Rome Statute.182 Therefore, to 
the proponents of this view, the inherently political nature of the ICC’s work is self-defeating 
in itself. The vexing question would be whether such prosecutorial discretion should not be 
viewed as a problem to be solved but a reason to reject and oppose the Court wholesale?183 It 
has been argued that poor drafting, mainly premised within what has been described as 
incomplete work of the Preparatory Committee. The Committee has been accused of not 
producing basic text or basic proposals that could have enabled smooth negotiations at the 
diplomatic conference.184 It is submitted that far as this is a plausible argument, it is flawed on 
so many levels. As a multi-national diplomatic conference per se, there were bound to be 
differences. There were nations that had different legal systems, different legal and historical 
cultures, some emanating from impunity, others not. Huge differences were bound to crop up 
and they cannot be solely blamed on the noble and commendable work that the Preparatory 
Committee had for so many years strenuously prepared. The pitfalls of prosecutorial discretion 
are already glaring in the face of the court’s adherents. So far justice has not been seen to be 
done. All decision-making and processes as regards administration of justice offences mirror 
                                                          
178 Rule 165 of the ICC RPE 
179 Rule 165(1) of the ICC RPE 
180 H. Olasolo, ‘The Prosecutor of the ICC before the initiation of investigations: A quasi -judicial or political 
body?’ 3 International Criminal Law Review (2003), p.87. 
181 A.M, Danner‘Enhancing the Legitimacy an Accountability of Prosecutorial Discretion at the International 
Criminal Court’, 97 American Journal of International Law (2003), p.510. 
182 Ibid 
183 Greenwalt, Op. Cit, p. 587 
184 S, Rosenne,  ‘Poor Drafting and Imperfect Organization: Flaws to Overcome in the Rome Statute’, 41 Virginia 
Journal of International Law (2000-2001), pp.166 -167. 
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disregard for even-handedness, aspirations of world community values and optimum order. 
Contrary to the OTP pursuing its noble duty of serving all actors in its decision-making process, 
its interpretation of offences against administration of justice and rules thereto mirrors 
narcissistic attitude. The OTP should strive to have investigations and prosecutions that focus 
on the OTP staff itself, its intermediaries185  and the defence. There should never be sacred 
cows. It is suggested that the OTP conduct and interpretation of the law so far in restraining 
from prosecutions and investigations against its own staff and intermediaries is a clear 
indication of conflict of interest fears such offices need to guard themselves against. It is 
suggested that at times in desperate attempts to strengthen its own case, OTP staff or even its 
intermediaries may go an extra-mile and engage in misconduct that is likely to be contrary to 
Articles 70 and 71 of the Rome Statute.  Numerous times there have been reports of misconduct 
allegations against intermediaries who promise victims and witnesses huge amounts of 
reparations at trial if they bring exaggerated testimony that will lead to conviction of alleged 
perpetrators.186 Just because they are OTP staff or OTP connected is no blank-cheque for such 
actors to engage in the same and escape the pangs or trappings of investigations and 
prosecutions. Possibly, the framing of the Rome Statute and the ICC RPE according the benefit 
of doubt on the OTP may have been in good faith, an expectation that the Chief Prosecutor will 
in the interests of justice only postulate the cherished gaols, dreams and aspirations that the 
ICC represents. So far no prosecutions have been brought against the OTP staff or the 
intermediaries for allegedly assisting witnesses or victims fabricate false testimony. Not even 
a single investigation has ever been announced to that effect. It is only those acting for the 
defence that have been brought to trial. On the other hand, reluctance of the OTP not to 
prosecute its own staff or intermediaries may reflect fear of shooting itself in the foot and such 
prosecutions have a potential or future intermediaries being reluctant to cooperate with the 
court. The Lubanga Case is a good example of the OTP engaging an independent consultant 
instead of actually investigating the misconduct allegations.187 Further, pursuant to the report 
by the said consultant, decided not to pursue further investigations into alleged misconduct by 
intermediaries.188 
                                                          
185 Persons that the OTP hires to help on the ground with investigations and contact of potential witnesses.  
186 Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ICC-01/04-01/06,  Decision of 31st May, 2010, para 25, http://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc881407.pdf accessed on 22 September 2015. 
187 Prosecutor v. Thomas Dyilo Lubanga, ICC-01/04-01/06,  Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute, 
Decision of 14 March, 2012, para 483, http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1379838.pdf accessed on 22 
September  2015. 
188 Prosecutor v. Thomas Dyilo Lubanga, Appeal Chamber, Prosecution Response to Requête de la Défense de 
M. Lubanga aux fins de communication d’éléments de preuve recueillis par le Procureur dans le cadre des 
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It is likely that this pitfall within the  prosecutorial discretion like many others within the Rome 
Statute, was a result of the negotiating maze that the delegates at Rome needed to muster. There 
were numerous disparities in languages, legal approaches and drafting techniques among the 
various working groups.189 Being an internationally negotiated instrument, the statute is not a 
perfect instrument.190 Thus Articles 70 and 71 mirror such uneasy technical solution, awkward 
formulation and difficult compromise that possibly satisfied no one. It is a product of 
harmonization of divergent and diametrically opposed national criminal laws and 
procedures.191 That notwithstanding , it can be argued that in order for Articles 70 and 71 to be 
effective, there is need for a balanced approach furnished with enough strength to ensure that 
there is operative functioning of the Court and sufficient safeguard for broad support from all 
actors in the administration of justice. Decision-makers within the Chambers should be able to 
censure and control non-compliance from OTP.192 It is suggested that possibly an amicus 
curiae or independent counsel as an office or appointed by the Chambers is the likely office 
that can bring to bear the views and aspirations of the delegates that converged at Rome. Thus 
persons other than the Chief Prosecutor or the OTP should investigate and prosecute all 
offences against the administration of justice. Not only will this avert conflict of interest within 
the OTP, it will also postulate a human good namely, the maxim justice must be seen to be 
done. OTP is unable to either investigate or guard itself and someone needs to do that noble 
and special role. Further, the OTP is already an office operating on shoe-string budget193, 
burdening it with investigations against administration of justice seems an overload.194 Such 
                                                          
enquêtes conduites en vertu de l’Article 70,  ICC-01/04-01/06, Decision of 25th March, 2014 , para 9,  
http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1753007.pdf accessed on 22 September 2015. 
189 C. Bassiouni, ‘Negotiating the Treaty of Rome on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court,’  32 
Cornell International Law Journal (1999), pp. 451-452. 
190 Editors in Chief, ‘The Rome Conference on an International Criminal Court: The Negotiating Process,’ 93 
American Journal of International Law (1999) p. 2-3. 
191 http://legal.un.org/icc/statute/iccq&a.htm accessed on 20 September 2015. 
192 M.S. Jaques  et. al, ‘ The OTP –v- Thomas Lubanga Dyilo: the Challenges of using “intermediaries” in the 
International Criminal Court, Humanitarian Law Perspectives, p. 9. 
193 J. O'Donohue, ‘The 2005 Budget of the International Criminal Court: Contingency, Insufficient Funding in 
Key Areas and the Recurring Question of the Independence of the Prosecutor,’ 18(3) Leiden Journal of 
International Law (2005), pp. 591-603; see also  J. O’Donohue,‘Financing the International Criminal Court,’ 
13(1) International Criminal Law Review (2013), pp.269-296 
194 D. Groome,‘No Witness, No Case: An Assessment of the Conduct and Quality of ICC Investigations,’ 3(1) 
Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs (2014), pp. 3-4. 
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an overload is a multiplicity of responsibilities on an already laden office195 with no proper 
code of conduct.196  
 
Apart from establishing additional criminal offences, Articles 70 and 71 establish a procedure 
for exercise of jurisdiction. Thus it is argued that in the absence of political will from 
cooperating states parties or third party states, there is likely occurrence of competing 
jurisdictional primacy. Further, it will be such a huge challenge for a state party categorized as 
an unwilling and unable state is likely not to cooperate with the court.197 ICC RPE rules 162-
164 underscore the sensitivity and complex nature of such jurisdictional primacy. Usually when 
it comes to competing jurisdictional primacy regard will go to political will,198 procedural 
rights availability, and likelihood of extradition procedure being effective and expeditious, 
admissibility of evidence procedures.199 Thus it is suggested that it will solely depend on how 
the ICC negotiates with the states parties or third party states as regards investigations, 
transmission of witnesses and extradition of accused persons. The ICC needs to take a 
deliberate effort that will achieve ultimate cooperation and avoid lengthy and bureaucratic 
mutual legal assistance processes. 
 
ICC skills and enlightenment200 in effectively making or competently observing and analysing 
key decisions as regards offences against administration of justice should focus on common 
interests or value preferences201 that postulate the applicable standard of evidence sufficiency 
for establishing the alleged substantial grounds charged.202 It has been argued that the 
                                                          
195 M.M. El Zeidy, ‘The Gravity Threshold Under the Statute of the International Criminal Court,’ 19(1) Criminal 
Law Forum (2008)  pp.35-57. 
196 M. Markovic ‘The ICC Prosecutor's Missing Code of Conduct,’  47(1) Texas International Law Journal 
(2011)pp. 202-235. 
197 Cryer, (n 2) pp. 201-203. 
198 S. Kayuni ‘Some Thoughts on Jurisdictional Primacy and the Fight Against Cross -Jurisdictional Criminality,’ 
52 International Association of Prosecutors (IAP) Newsletter  (2011) pp. 17-20, http://www.iap-
association.org/News accessed on 19 September 2015.  
199 C. Warbrick, & K. Brookson-Morris ‘Conflicts of Criminal Jurisdiction,’ 56 International & Comparative Law 
Quarterly (2007) p.659. 
200 M. McDougal  & H. Lasswell ‘Jurisprudence in Policy-Oriented Perspective,’ 19 University of Florida Law 
Review (1967), p. 490. 
201 Ibid, pp. 500-501. 
202 Prosecutor v. Jean Pierre Bemba Gombo, Aime Kilolo Musamba, Jean-Jacques Mangenda Kabongo, Fidele 
Babala Wandu and Narcisse Arido, Decision pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute, ICC-01/05-
01/13-749 11-11-2014 11/55 EO PT, (PT I) Decision of 11 th November, 2014, para 25, http://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1857534.pdf  accessed on 22 September 2015.  
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evidential threshold203 must be met or satisfied.204 That notwithstanding, it is not only about 
ICC jurisprudence205  but prudence as well namely, a thoroughly satisfactory case that the OTP 
has sufficiently strong allegations for purposes of trial.206 On his or her observational 
standpoint and tapping from his or her bases of power, such Prosecutor must aver before court 
concrete and tangible proof about the alleged offences.207 Offences above have in some ways 
defences that can be raised dependent on the circumstances of the each case. Thus regardless, 
it is submitted that lawyers or attorneys role as defence team do not insulate them from criminal 
consequences of their corruptly or interfering motives or actions. General defences such as 
lawyer-client privilege have negligible degree of success. Thus it is suggested that pursuant to 
Article 70 or 71, the Chamber in receiving evidence or explanation from a lawyer who is 
accused and part of defence team, should be live and vigilant in discerning the ulterior motive 
that led to the lawyer conducting himself or herself as alleged. That is the only way the 
Chambers can accord itself the opportunity of drawing contradictory inferences. If the 
allegation is within the misconduct offences, there is need for a factual or legal basis 
establishment.208 Probably the vexing question should be whether or not the purported defence 
team member intended to tamper or interfere with the administration of justice. Thus it is 
suggested that defence need to concentrate on impeaching the probative value of prosecution 
evidence to the extent that the alleged false testimony could not have impeded the Chamber’s 
inquiry into appreciating the case before it.  
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Prosecutor against the ‘Decision on the Prosecution’s Application for a Warrant of Arrest against Omar Hassan 
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204 Prosecutor v. Francis Muthaura, Uhuru Kenyatta and Mohammed Hussein Ali , Decision on the Confirmation 
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F. Conclusion 
It has been argued that the vote to adopt the Rome Statute was a historical moment and 
breakthrough raising expectations of the world community for an unequivocal aspiration to end 
impunity and grave violations of human rights.209 It can be described as a serious attempt by 
the international community to accord dignity to humanity. In order to afford this, there was 
need to protect the integrity of the Court’s juridical proceedings through the creation of an 
offence against witness tampering or interference.210 That notwithstanding, a closer scrutiny of 
the Rome Statute unveils a maze of legal technicalities and insufficiencies as regards guarding 
against the offending the administration of justice.  It is probably a consequence of what some 
scholars have described as a product of a spirit of compromise during the diplomatic 
negotiations at Rome.211 A revolution of some sort.212 That notwithstanding, the problematic 
question about interference with the administration of justice is becoming a reality for the ICC 
thus requiring urgent and adequate attention.213  
 
Particular decisions made as regards the offences against the administration of justice should 
be appraised by looking at the degree of contribution to the achievement of a public order of 
human dignity.214 It will be such a mammoth task for the whichever ICC Judge preside over 
the very first full trial on the offences against administration of justice offences. With no 
procedural practice and precedence and ICC jurisprudence to look up to, it is likely to be a 
fascinating challenge215 and a comparative criminal procedure labyrinth. The centrality and 
long term effects of offences against the administration of justice leaves the ICC decision-
makers with only one option, namely pro-active and supersonic speed as regards investigations 
and prosecutions into alleged offences. Following the STL model, it is suggested that an 
independent Counsel appointed by the Chamber would make the process more credible than 
                                                          
209 K. Ambos‘General Principles of Criminal Law in the Rome Statute,’ 10 Criminal Law Forum (1999) p. 1. 
210 Article 70 (1) (c) of the Rome Statute. 
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International Criminal Law Review (2015), pp. 700-732. 
214 S. Wiessner ‘Law as a Means to a Public Order of Human Dignity: The Jurisprudence of Michael Reisman,’ 
34 Yale Journal of International Law (2009), p. 525. 
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Compromise,’ 1 Journal of International Criminal Justice (2003) p. 617. 
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the OTP led prosecutions or prosecutorial monopoly.216 The end of the law is its aspiration to 
achieve human dignity. Therefore, its legitimacy is partly a function of whether it passes the 
test of consistency with community values. Thus this appointment is likely to competently 
represent the world community values agreed at Rome and postulate justice goals by 
considering a case to case basis approach to indictment decision-making. In a balanced 
approach, it is likely to proficiently sift through gathered evidence bearing in mind the 
probative value and relevance of mens rea of the alleged offenders.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
216 Hieramente, M, Muller, P, Ferguson, E, (2014) Barasa, Bribery and Beyond: Offences against the 
Administration of Justice at the International Criminal Court, 14(6) International Criminal Law Review, pp. 1123-
1149. 
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